

responding superiority of the Chancelade man over the French indicated by *his* capacity of 1710 cc.? The anthropologist rarely has to deal with cultural differences so enormous as those between the Upper Paleolithic and our present industrial civilization. If an organic equipment at least equal to ours is consistent with a Stone Age culture, then—whether racial differences are real or imaginary, great or small—they cannot “adequately explain” the observed phenomena. If *they* cannot explain them, we must fall back upon factors of another category, and these may reasonably be lumped together as “cultural.” They do not always explain *adequately*, but at least relying upon them does not involve the absurdity of deriving a variable (Culture) from a constant (Race); nor the ridiculous proposition that a higher innate equipment is correlated with an inferior culture. About all this there is not the slightest boldness, nothing but the sober application of the canon of varying concomitants. It is a bit hard when this exposes one to the charge of erring as much as a fantastic genius like Gobineau or an ignorant if not deliberately dishonest propagandist like Mr. Grant, whose “biological and anthropological charlatanry” (p. 187) the author himself exposes.

If so much more space has been given to the elucidation of this simple point than to an appreciation of Professor Hankins’ luminous treatise, it is in the hope of promoting a better understanding between him and the cultural anthropologists.

ROBERT H. LOWIE

*The Origin of the State.* ROBERT H. LOWIE. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927.

For the past sixty years specialists in government have almost invariably followed Sir Henry Maine in assuming that a clean-cut historical distinction could be made between the pre-state period when men were held together for governmental purposes by the tie of blood, and the state period when they evolved the principle of local contiguity. The accumulation of ethnological data in the supervening years has served to emphasize the similarities rather than the divergencies of life among “primitive” and “civilized,” with the result that any theory which postulates sharp differences and stages is under suspicion. So overpowering has been the prestige of Maine and so absorbed has been the attention of professional anthropologists, that the ineptitude of the kin-contiguity theory has never been seriously exposed. Social science is to be congratulated that Professor Lowie has found it worth his while to go forth to do battle.

Professor Lowie believes that primitive peoples are organized in a way that warrants our speaking of their governmental units as states, or at least as rudimentary states. The simplest peoples known (such as the Yurok, Angami Naga, and the Ifugao) have a sense of belonging to a territorial social unit larger than a kin group, and act to defend the order with which this sentiment is bound up. Thus among the Ifugao the thief from another village is killed outright; the thief from a kin group in the same village is merely fined. In the case of adultery involving the member of a kin group resident in the village, it is recognized that he owes an obligation of some kind to the kin which has been wronged.

Evidence of this kind is amassed to substantiate the thesis that a more-than-kin territorial tie exists, and then Lowie storms the whole fortress of kinship theory. He argues that the conception of kinship as something independent of contiguity is false, cogently contending that the bond of relationship when defined in sociological rather than biological terms is itself in no small measure a derivative of local contiguity.

Reviewing the data respecting associations, Lowie modifies his earlier conclusion that they tended to build up the state by welding bonds of unity across kin lines, and says that they are not inherently either centralizing or disruptive agencies, the crucial factor being the correlated factors of integration. As often as not, among the Crow for instance, the rivalry of associations may endanger the unity of the state.

Franz Oppenheimer's extension of the Marxian interpretation of the state is given the attention which it richly deserves. Oppenheimer holds that the state is a form of exploitation of the mass of the community for the benefit of a ruling few. It came into existence when pastoral nomads conquered agrarian peoples and required them to turn over part of the products of their labor to the conquerors. Lowie's objections may be succinctly put thus: There are cases where the subject classes of the community suffer no economic exploitation; there is evidence that the pastoral peoples were themselves organized in states before they conquered agrarians; rational exploitation is alien to the primitive attitude of mind, mixed as it is with ideological conceptions of a contradictory sort. Even when considered as a theory of caste rather than a theory of the state, Oppenheimer has failed to prove that castes only come into being through conquest.

When he considers the factors which affect the size of the state, Lowie shows that the enlargement of the state cannot be attributed to military spirit solely, for not alone in the case of the Polynesians or the Plains Indians were major political organizations lacking though war was common. The decisive factor is organizing capacity, which may express itself in the consolidation of conquests or in voluntary unification. The only cited example of peaceable establishment of a large-scale organization is the legendary one of the Iroquois under Hiawatha.

It is perhaps ungracious for a student of government to cavil at the limitations of an essay which is so stuffed with weighty matter as this one, but there are at least two points upon which further elaboration would be especially welcome. Lowie says that organizing capacity is the essential factor in state growth, but he throws out no systematic hints as to the types of traits which predispose a culture to develop the adaptations which are lumped together under this expression. Although Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg showed a correlation between complexity of material culture and complexity of political organization, this carries us but a little way.

Something in suggestive quality would have been gained had a section been devoted to an appraisal of the function of political organization in relation to the rest of culture. The traditional students of government are wedded to a set of rather clumsy rationalizations which blur their vision of the rôle of the state in the matrix where it functions. It is the private prejudice of the reviewer that the most distinctive contribution of anthropology to political science will consist in stirring up the governmental specialist to a new slant on the significance of the social patterns with which he is too often content to deal in a spirit of splendid, though sterile, isolation.

After all, my complaint against Professor Lowie is nothing more serious than that he evidently has other things of no less importance to do than spend a lifetime on the details of the field which he has so brilliantly mapped.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*Primitive Man, His Essential Quest.* JOHN MURPHY, D. Litt. 341 pp.  
Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York, 1927.  
\$5.00.